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I. INTRODUCTION
T here is no body of precedents by which we are bound, and
which confines us to logical deductions from established
rules. Therefore we must consider the two objects of desire, both
of which we cannot have, and make up our minds which to
choose.'
The technological growth of twentieth century American society corre-
spondingly demanded that the government expand to deal with these in-
novations. Yet, as the complexity of the government increased, it became
* The author extends sincere thanks to Karen Cooper, Michael T. Rae, and Daniel
Domozick, whose help was invaluable.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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apparent that in order to effectively implement the new legislative poli-
cies, Congress would have to delegate quite extensive authority. It is the
doctrine of the delegation of powers that allowed one branch of the gov-
ernment to transfer authority to another branch or administrative
agency,' and which laid the foundation for the proliferation of adminis-
trative agencies and governmental bureaucracy. Subsequently, however, a
need for some control over this delegated authority developed. In re-
sponse, Congress adopted the procedure which has come to be known as
the legislative veto.
In its most simple terms, the legislative veto is a process, short of en-
actment of full legislation, by which the legislature requires the executive
or an agency to refrain from taking a proposed action.' Usually, Congress
will enact a statute that requires implementation by the executive or by
an administrative agency. Pursuant to the delegation of authority in the
enabling statute, the affected agency will be required to submit to Con-
gress whatever rules, orders, regulations, or directives it intends to imple-
ment. If the legislature does not concur with the administrative determi-
nation, the legislative veto may be exercised to approve, disapprove,
amend, or terminate the proposed action. In this manner, Congress was
able to control the authority it had delegated by precluding objectionable
administrative determinations from becoming law.
Embodied in literally hundreds of statutes, the use of the legislative
veto traces back to the Hoover administration. 4 Yet, despite its longevity,
the veto has not been overwhelmingly approved. In fact, its use has pro-
2 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 375 U.S. 146 (1953); Minnesota ex rel.
R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 281, 37 N.W. 782
(1888).
3 See Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1976-77); Javits & Klein, Con-
gress and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455 (1977).
The legislative veto most commonly assumes one of two forms: one is a simple resolution
passed by either House of Congress (the one-House veto) and the other is the concurrent
resolution which is passed by both Houses (the two-House veto). For the purposes of this
Note, these two types of vetoes will be the only ones considered in depth. For a detailed
explanation of the different forms of congressional vetoes, see Miller & Knapp, The Con-
gressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1976-77).
' For a detailed history of the development of the legislative veto, see Watson, Congress
Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CsxLis. L. REv. 983 (1975).
It should be noted that despite its importance the legislative veto was not used frequently.
Between 1930 and 1982, Congress exercised an approximate total of 230 vetoes. A rough
breakdown of this total shows that 111 of these terminated suspentions of deportation or-
ders, 65 were exercised under the Budget Control and Impoundments Acts, 24 disapproved
of a few of the many reorganizations for the government proposed by various presidents,
and the remaining 30 were exercised in the areas of foreign relations, international com-
merce or defense, or in regulatory matters. See Comment, Was There a Baby in the





voked bitter debate throughout the government.' The thrust of the con-
troversy has concerned whether the congressional veto is an unconstitu-
tional attempt by Congress to interfere with the execution of the laws, or
whether it is a permissible device that protects against the usurpation of
congressional power by another branch of the government.
No satisfactory resolution of the debate had been proffered until June
of 1983, when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Chadha v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service.' The Court sustained a decision of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which held unconstitutional a one-
House veto that had cancelled a decision of the Attorney General to sus-
pend the deportation order of Chadha and five other aliens. Broadly
holding that the one-House veto contravened the bicameral and present-
ment clauses of the Constitution, the Court's decision appeared to leave
little room for speculation that the legislative veto might still be a viable
congressional tool.
This Note will initially trace the historical setting in which Chadha was
decided. In light of the staunch defense of and radical opposition to the
veto, the Court's decision will then be analyzed in terms of its scope as
well as its potential ramifications. The major focus will concern the future
of existing laws which presently embody legislative vetoes, whether they
are valid despite these provisions, and how the future of congressional
oversight may be affected by the potential demise of the legislative veto.
Finally, this Note will recommend a proposal by which the legislature
may monitor delegated power in the wake of this landmark decision.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEBATE
At one time, the delegation doctrine raised fears and doubts in the
minds of those legislators who believed that they were unconstitutionally
abdicating their own power. Yet, with the growth of a complex technical
society and the advent of the "knowledge explosion," smaller bodies,
more able and better equipped to deal with these changes were required.
7
As the New Deal era passed, the constitutional question concerning the
validity of the delegation of power was ultimately resolved in Congress'
favor.' As a result, delegation has become commonplace and the "fourth
branch" has become a powerful and integral element of the American sys-
tem of government. Administrative and executive agencies are virtually
indispensible in today's society. However, the fact exists that the agencies
have distorted the tripartite balance of government originally contem-
See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
-___ U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
See Miller & Knapp, supra note 3, at 375.
See Bruff & Gelhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study
of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
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plated by the Framers of the Constitution.' Not only was their existence
not envisioned, but as they developed, the agencies essentially have come
to exercise powers originally destined for other branches of government.
While broadly sweeping delegations have enabled agencies to promul-
gate rules that bear the effect of law, the technique utilized falls some-
what short of the legislative scheme particularized in the Constitution.
Furthermore, unlike the executive and the legislative branches, agencies
are not comprised of elected officials and consequently, lack the account-
ability to the electorate that is maintained by the other branches.10 Dele-
gated and unchecked power is unequivocally dangerous. The legislative
veto had supplied the missing link. The veto had been utilized to provide
the needed check and to establish a harness of accountability between the
agencies and Congress." By vesting the final authority for an administra-
tive decision back with the legislature, the agencies could not function
0 See Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional
Power, 68 VA. L. REv. 253 (1982). This lack of equilibrium has not been eagerly accepted:
American attitudes toward the agencies have always demonstrated a fundamental
ambivalence. On one hand, administrative agencies are viewed as necessary vehi-
cles for the development of policy and are often created to resolve issues that
Congress is unwilling or unable to decide. They are expected to develop experi-
ence and specialized knowledge and to provide efficient administration of complex
and burdensome tasks. On the other hand, Americans are suspicious of delegation
of lawmaking authority to agencies, which seems inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion's allocation of the responsibility for lawmaking to Congress.
Bruff & Gelhorn, supra note 8 at 1372. See J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETo: UNSEPARAT-
INO THE POWERS (1977).
10 While the constituents of elected officials have recourse against elected officials who
have pursued an "inappropriate" course of action through the next election, the constituents
are powerless in this respect as far as agency administrators are concerned. See Newman &
Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of the Laws-Should Legislators Supervise
Administrators?, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 565 (1953).
" Representative Elliot H. Levitas reiterated the sentiment that some degree of control
over the agencies by the legislature is necessary:
The federal bureaucracy has evolved into a fourth non-constitutional branch of
government, with a thick tangle of regulations that carry the force of law without
the benefit of legislative consideration. I frankly do not believe that the precepts
of a free society are compatible with the situation whereby Congress contrives to
permit civil servants or appointed officials to conjure up thousands upon
thousands of far reaching laws that can put citizens in jeopardy of liberty or prop-
erty without having anyone elected by the people involved in the process.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and Related Bills, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 141
(1975) (Statement of Representative Elliot H. Levitas). Through the use of the veto, Con-
gress had been able to approve or disapprove of proposed administrative regulations. There-
fore, final authority for the implementation of a rule remained with the legislature which is
ultimately responsible to the constituents. While it is a disconcerting thought to realize that
the voters are powerless to directly remove administrators who are making the laws, there is
consolation in that redress may be pursued through Congressmen who may be held liable
for the acts of appointed officials. See Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitu-
tion-A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978).
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independently without regard for the will of Congress and thus, ulti-
mately, the electorate. Rather Congress, itself definitively answerable to
its constituency, would be responsible for the final determination of an
administrative decision. The legislative veto, then, was a tool to ensure
enactments consistent with Congressional intent. The delegation of power
was no longer an ominous alternative, for by retaining the final authority,
the idea of full relinquishment of power was but a hollow fear.
The glory of the delegation doctrine is reflected in the legislature's abil-
ity to delegate broad powers and policy directives to the agencies. 2 Since
Congress often lacks the skill and knowledge to direct specific agency ac-
tion, general delegations allow the agencies to examine problems in detail
and then issue rules based on their findings. The problem with such dele-
gation, however, is that if Congress delegates nonspecific policy directives
and legislative mandates for the agencies to implement, it runs the risk
that decisions will be promulgated which are inconsistent with the will of
the legislature as a whole. When used as an oversight mechanism, 3 the
legislative veto insured that the Congress would be able to monitor
agency action: it provided a "check" against the possibility of abused or
misused powers,14 and it guaranteed continued congressional participa-
tion in the legislative process. As a result, Congress was able to delegate
with ease.
The necessity of a device to oversee the activities of the agencies is
clear. The question which had plagued the constitutional law experts was
whether the legislative veto was a legitimate means by which to achieve
this goal. 15
1 The delegation of powers doctrine does require that Congress promulgate reasonable
standards by which the agencies are to act. While these standards were once extremely
strict, they have since been relaxed thus allowing broader, relatively nonspecific delegations.
See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1930).
" In general, oversight mechanisms allow Congress to monitor the implementation of
policy to insure compliance with "Congress's [sic] current interpretation of the public inter-
est." Javits & Klein, supra note 3, at 472-73.
" The legislative veto may be an appealing alternative to check agency action when
compared with other possibilities.
When the delegator is the legislature, it has the power to specify that some actions
are within the scope of the delegate's power and that others are not. If the dele-
gate pursues an impermissible action, the legislative power would be an empty one
indeed if the legislature lacked the simple power to constrain the delegate's action
within the scope of the delegation. It has been argued that the legislature should,
at such a time, enact a new law to more specifically define the scope of the delega-
tion. Such a course, however, would subject the legislative act to executive veto,
requiring a two-thirds vote of the legislature to override. This means that a two-
thirds vote of the legislature is needed to define more precisely the scope of a
delegation, where the original delegation requires but a majority vote. ...
Abourezk, supra note 3, at 332.
" It may help . . . to think of the legislation [delegation] as unfinished law which the
1984-85]
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A. The Advocates of the Legislative Veto
The efficiency and the effectiveness of the legislative veto as an over-
sight device was not doubted. However, the thrust of the historical debate
concerning the legislative veto had focused on whether it was a constitu-
tionally permissible means to achieve these ends." The veto is neither
specifically sanctioned nor prohibited in the Constitution and, therefore,
if it were to be sustained, it would have to have been as an implied
power.7
Proponents of the veto had attempted to justify its use under the nec-
essary and proper clause of the Constitution." According to this theory,
the veto is but a legitimate means to make the agencies accountable to
Congress, and, since it does not violate any specific clause of the Consti-
tution, the use of the veto is facially valid. 9 Furthermore, not only does
the veto serve as a means to effectuate the legislative will, but it also
functionally preserves the separation of powers: by returning the final
policymaking authority to the Congress, it is assured that the lawmaking
administrative body must complete before it is ready for application. In a very real
sense the legislation does not bring to a close the making of the law. The Congress is
not able or willing to finish the task of presenting a positive and precise legal right or
duty by eliminating all further choices between policies ...
Javits & Klein, supra note 3, at 475 (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 485-86
(1956) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (holding that the Court would not interfere with orders re-
lating to the Clayton Act except when the remedy has no rational relation to the unlawful
practice)); see also Abourezk, supra note 3, at 334-55 (the veto allows continued congres-
sional participation in the legislative process); Javits & Klein, supra note 3, at 478-79 (Con-
gress maintains authority as long as the control remains legislative in nature); Pearson,
Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 277, 281
(1975) (via the veto, Congress continues to participate in the legislative process); Schwartz,
supra note 11, at 374 (the overriding need for the veto may give force to an argument for its
validity).
16 See J. BOLTON, supra note 9; Abourezk, supra note 3; Cooper & Cooper, The Legisla-
tive Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); FitzGerald, Congres-
sional Oversight and Congressional Foresight: Guidelines from the Founding Fathers, 28
An. L. REV. 429 (1976); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16
HARV. J. ON LEGis. 735 (1979); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Con-
trol of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983 (1975).
" Even as an implied power, the veto must still be consistent with the Constitution. If it
is, then its use ought to be sanctioned. "Any means that violate no Constitutional provision
and are reasonably calculated to benefit the exercise of legislative power should be sus-
tained." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326 (1819); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (sustaining a challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971).
"1 "The Congress shall have the Power . . . to make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.




powers will not be exercised by any other branch of the government.2 0
Without this check, certain congressional powers would be lodged outside
of the legislative branch in violation of the doctrine of the separation of
powers. This is the legitimate "end" which the veto sought to serve.
While the legislative veto may return the final determination of an ad-
ministrative decision to Congress, it is still the agencies that are promul-
gating the rules; Congress is merely legitimizing the conduct. Thus, the
advocates urged that in its operation as a check on agency action, the
legislative veto essentially functioned as a condition precedent to the final
implementation of an administrative directive. That is to say, that before
a particular regulation could gain the force and effect of law, it must first
pass congressional muster. Even if it were not exercised, the presence of a
legislative veto in the enabling legislation of an agency ensured that the
legislature could approve, disapprove, or amend administrative proposals.
Congressional consideration was not only a condition precedent to final
action, but it also allowed Congress, as noted above, to retain the final
authority. In this manner, when an agency rendered a decision, the status
quo remained unchanged.2' Furthermore, since Congress, at the outset,
had the choice whether or not to delegate any power to the agency, advo-
cates stressed that the legislature could attach any condition or contin-
gency to the execution of that power.2 2 Although Congress was not com-
pelled to act, the condition precedent provided for legislative
involvement, when necessary, to insure administrative compliance with
Congressional mandates.
Though the legislative veto was not specifically provided for in the
Constitution, proponents of the device assert that it is compatible with
the procedural standards for lawmaking prescribed in the Constitution.2"
While the President may not be involved in the execution of the veto, by
passing the enabling legislation which delegated the power to the agency,
he has technically sanctioned the review (and veto) process. The expecta-
tion that a legislative veto could be used, if necessary, to demand compli-
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The analysis becomes clearer when you categorize the
agencies as a division of the executive branch. Under this theory the agencies would be
accountable to the executive, rather than to Congress, who initially delegated the power.
Absent the veto, the executive could possess the final authority for administrative decisions.
This would allow executive encroachment on the legislative powers. But through the use of
the veto, the legislative power is ultimately returned to the Congress and all powers are
exercised in conformity with the Constitution. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
opinions concerning the continued vitality of the division of powers, see Abourezk, supra
note 3, at 329-34.
" See Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423 (1978).
2- Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 12 (1939); but see 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 230 (1955) (al-
though a condition may be valid, it may not be exercised if it is unconstitutional; the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions demands as much).
23 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 286.
1984-85]
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ance with the enabling statute, constituted an "integral part of the origi-
nal policy decision. '24 Therefore, the lack of executive involvement in the
ultimate determination is theoretically immaterial.
B. The Arguments in Opposition
The weakness of the proponents" arguments lies in the fact that they
are primarily based on policy. In their search for justifications, the advo-
cates have basically sideswiped the constitutional arguments. Assertions
that the veto is a valid exercise of legislative power stumble when bal-
anced against the constitutional construction urged by the proponents. 21
While the supporters of the veto rely on the necessary and proper clause
to bolster their position, it must be remembered that powers exercised
under this portion of the Constitution may not contravene any other pro-
vision. 6 Those opposing the use of the legislative veto urge that a strict
reading of the Constitution must yield the determination that the legisla-
tive veto violates the doctrine of the separation of powers.2 7 Therefore,
not even the necessary and proper clause can breathe life into this un-
sound mechanism.
The Framers of the Constitution embraced the idea that "power cor-
rupts" and that individuals must be protected against its tyrannical exer-
cise." This power was especially threatening when wielded by one body,
and it was felt that only a separation of powers could protect against a
concentration of power which could threaten liberty. The separation of
powers was therefore adopted by the Framers to protect against the pos-
sible abuses which could result from unchecked power.
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid fric-
tion, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distri-
Cooper & Cooper, supra note 16, at 476. See Abourezk, supra note 3, at 338; Ginnane,
The Control of the Federal Administration by Congressional Resolution and Committees,
66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953). However, presidential acquiescence in a major policy decision
or in the execution of a law is immaterial if the proposal (in this case the veto) is unconsti-
tutional. If the veto device is invalid, presidential approval of the enabling legislation is
irrelevant. J. BOLTON, supra note 9, at 129-30. See also Watson, supra note 16 at 995-1016
(presidents have acquiesced to enabling legislation embodying a legislative veto, but they
have generally not approved).
2" See infra text accompanying notes 80-92.
2" See supra note 17.
" The proponents of the legislative veto do not deny the vitality of the doctrine of the
separation of powers. Rather, they urge that since the veto does not constitute a "legislative
act," it is incompatible with the doctrine. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
28 Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1976). For a
detailed discussion on the drawbacks of the separation of powers, see W. WILSON, CONGRES-




bution of the governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy.2"
The separation of powers is not specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, but rather is implied from the enumerated powers of the three
branches. If and when one branch exercises a duty properly belonging to
another, a violation of the doctrine occurs.30
The Constitution specifically prescribes guidelines for the legislative
process. The requirements for lawmaking mandate that a law passed by a
bicameral legislature with presidential approval (or a two thirds majority
to override a presidential veto).3 " Opponents of the veto argue that it vio-
lates the separation of powers doctrine because it is the equivalent of a
legislative act which does not conform to the constitutional standards.
32
29 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (holding that Congress may not de-
prive the President of the power to remove certain subordinate officials from office). The
doctrine was one to which the Framers had given extensive consideration at the Constitu-
tional Convention and in the Federalist Papers. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying
text. But see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121: "Yet it is also clear from the provisions of the Con-
stitution itself, anf from the Federalist Papers, that the Constitution by no means contem-
plates total separation of each of these three essential branches of Government"
20 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977) (determining that the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act did not prevent the Executive from
accomplishing his constitutionally assigned functions and did not violate the presidential
privilege of confidentiality); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (no branch of the
government may share powers that are the exclusive domain of another); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (deciding that the President had violated the
separation of powers doctrine by seizing the steel mills to avert a nationwide strike);
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (each of the three departments should be
completely independent of each other and should not be controlled directly, indirectly, or by
influence by another); Springer v. Government of the Philippine [sic] Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928) (the separation and consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred upon
each of the three departments is basic and vital).
2 See infra note 34.
52 The proponents of the legislative veto assert that the use of the device does not con-
stitute "legislating" in the sense intended by the Constitution and, therefore, is not subject
to the procedural constraints of the Constitution. The rationale that supports this argument
is twofold. First, the veto does not have the "force and effect" of law because Congress is
only reviewing an administrative action, not passing new laws. Congress is merely ensuring
compliance with the enabling legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 1014, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1976). Second, if the veto is merely a condition precedent to the final implementation of an
administrative proposal, it does not constitute "legislating" because the regulation in ques-
tion has not yet taken effect. Therefore, a veto does not change the status quo. See
Abourezk, supra note 3, at 336-37. However, once Congress has created an agency and de-
fined its powers, it is argued, "any attempt to alter that original legislation, as by specific
restrictions on the agency's exercise of its powers, is a legislative act equivalent to repeal or
amendment which can be properly accomplished only through the full legislative process."
Conley, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Probable Response to a Consti-
tutional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285, 288-89 (1976) (footnote omitted).
[Tihe fact that a legislative veto does not modify existing law, but merely main-
tains it as unaltered, does not mean that the veto is not of legislative character.
1984-85]
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This distinction forms the crux of the constitutional debate: is the legisla-
tive veto an act of legislating? If it is, it must conform to the enumerated
standards. The opponents of the veto urge that by approving or disap-
proving of an administrative proposal, Congress may change or amend a
law affecting the substantive rights and duties of individuals. To catego-
rize the veto as a condition precedent, or as a proposal without the "force
and effect" of law, is to inherently preserve form over substance. By
utilizing the veto to prescribe standards, alter administrative proposals,
and ultimately, change the law, Congress impermissibly steps outside of
the legislative process designated by the Constitution.a
Opponents of the legislative veto assert that it specifically contravenes
the Constitution in several ways. First, all proposed legislation, before be-
coming law, must be presented to the President for his approval. 3 4
Through the use of the veto, Congress was able to make substantive deci-
The Constitutional measurement of Article I is concerned with who ultimately
determines the content of prevailing law rather than whether other statutes are
modified. Under such [a] statutory scheme, executive proposals for change are
more than mere recommendations, because at the expiration of the waiting period
they become law in the absence of Congressional disapproval. Since the proposals
themselves are the embodiment of legislation that has already been passed by
Congress, their nullification aborts law that would otherwise take effect. Can Con-
gress, in effect, change the ordinary constitutional requirement for repeal by
'bootstrapping,' by reserving the right to repeal by less than full legislation?
Henry, supra note 16, at 747. See S. REP. No. 1325, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897).
1 See Watson, supra note 16, at 991. Furthermore, it is possible that the avoidance of
constitutional procedures is "purposeful." That Congress "should chose to act by legislative
veto rather than statute, suggests that far more is operating here than a mere desire for
streamlining. It suggests instead that the legislative veto permits different substantive out-
comes through a more comfortable avoidance of direct legislative responsibility for the cru-
cial policy choices." Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congres-
sional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 290 n.101 (1982). This is unfortunately true although the
possibility for this sort of streamlining is an appealing one. Re-legislating every time an
agency promulgates a rule inconsistent with legislative intent is time consuming and imprac-
tical. But, as stated, efficiency is a weak argument when balanced against constitutional
construction.
3' The U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3 provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
if he approves he shall sign it, but if he shall not he shall return it, with his objec-
tions to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objec-
tions at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Recon-
sideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law . . . Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the
Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives ....
[Vol. 33:145
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sions without any presidential involvement. For example, an agency could
render a decision that was consistent with an executive directive which
Congress could then dismiss, thus effectuating an ironic turn of events: in
essence, it was the executive branch which was making the law and the
legislature that was exercising the veto power. If this premise is accepted,
then not only does Congress violate the constitutionally prescribed re-
quirements, but it also encroachs on executive functions . 3  The veto
usurps the President's power to execute the laws by monitoring their im-
plementation35 Even though the President was involved in the passage of
the enabling legislation, he was not consulted with respect to those later
congressional determinations that were rendered via the legislative veto.
3 7
Advocates of this position maintain that this exercise constitutes a unilat-
eral reversal of a presidential decision while bypassing the constitutional
guidelines.3a
The opponents assert that the Constitution is further violated by the
avoidance of both Houses of Congress in the lawmaking process. 9 The
" See supra note 20. Furthermore, the legislative encroachment on the powers of other
branches is potentially two-fold:
If [these provisions] envision Congress' setting regulations aside on the basis of its
own notions as to what constitutes desirable enforcement policy, they intrude
upon the Executive's functions [execution of the laws]. If, on the other hand, they
mean only to permit congressional review of the Executive's compliance with stat-
utory intent, they intrude upon the province of the Judiciary. Either way, they
carry Congress beyond its proper function of making laws under Article I of the
Constitution.
FitzGerald, supra note 16, at 432 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 8231, H.R. 3658, and Related
Bills before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1975) (Statement of Assistant Attorney
General Antonin Scalia)).
11 Just as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), held that the
legislative sphere of power cannot permissibly be invaded by the executive, so the executive
sphere may not be invaded by Congress. See Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Admin-
istrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 NW.
U.L. REv. 1064 (1981).
11 Presidential assent to substantive alternations, approval, or disapproval cannot render
the use of the veto valid if it is unconstitutional-the formality of presentment will still be
required. Failure to follow the requirement will not be tolerated.
Although the Framers of the Constitution justifiably expected that the two elected
branches would solve most separation of powers questions politically, they did not
intend that the judicial branch should stand by while one of the elected branches
acted behond its constitutional limits. Nor does the fact that the legislative veto
has been frequently employed make it valid. "That an unconstitutional action has
been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitu-
tional at a later date."
J. BOLTON, supra note 9, at 12-13 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47
(1969)).
11 Even if the use of the veto is viewed as amending or repealing a statute, that too
categorically constitutes lawmaking and should be subject to Article I.
" This violation pertains primarily to the one-House veto. See supra note 3 and accom-
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Constitution requires that any act of legislation must be passed by both a
House of Representatives and a Senate.4 Assuming that the legislative
branch was the most likely to take on powers more properly entrusted to
another branch, the Framers clearly provided for bicameral approval as a
check on the potential abuses of power by one House: bicameralism
would protect against hasty, illadvised, and misconsidered action." The
conclusion that the concurrence of both Houses and presentment to the
President are required with respect to all exercises by Congress of its leg-
islative powers finds further support from the Constitution itself. For the
situations in which the Framers did intend a departure from these re-
quirements, they expressly so provided.42 Therefore, the constraints and
procedures specified by the Framers cannot be regarded as mere formali-
ties that may be ignored in the lawmaking process."' To avoid these stan-
dards would sacrifice the ideals that the Framers struggled to preserve.,
panying text.
'0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
11 This opinion was specifically embraced by the Framers of the Constitution: "The Con-
stitution lodges legislative authority in a bicameral legislature in part as an internal check
against the aggrandizement of Congressional Power." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315-16 (J.
Madison) (New American Library ed. 1961).
Congress steps outside of the legislative process when it passes and acts according
to a statute authorizing later action by resolution or committee vote, thereby re-
taining jurisdiction over the subject matter of legislation. Such a statute creates a
new role for Congress, ambiguously situated between the legislative and executive
functions . . . .While the text of the Constitution provides no clear boundaries to
Congressional activity, however, it does provide several specific checks to Con-
gress' power.
Watson, supra note 16, at 991-2. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129; see also Dixon, supra note
21, at 441 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10 (1977) (comments of
Congressman Drinan) (The Great Compromise, indicative of the Framers" mandate for bi-
cameralism, is undermined by the legislative veto)).
- The Constitution specifies when one House may act without the other. E.g., U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 6 (the House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachment);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 cl. 5 (the Senate alone has the power to convict following impeach-
ment); U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 12 (the Senate alone may pass presidential appointments);
U.S. CONST. art. I. § 5, cl. 2 and § 7 cl. 2, 3 (each body may pass on their own rules of
proceedings). See also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (presidential
approval is not necessary for constitutional amendments).
41 While the Farmers may not have believed in a "hermetic sealing" off of the three
branches, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121, it is clear that they did not condone the use of devices
to circumvent the Constitution. "It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the
American Constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to
the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial
power .. " Springer, 277 U.S. at 201.
- The Framers were not only concerned with creating a government free of the tyran-
nies that had faced them previously, but they were also solicitous of the fact that the only
way that this could be prevented would be to anticipate the possible infirmities of their
design.
The Framers' concern over the conflict between public and private interests was




The assailants of the legislative veto further contend that it violates the
Constitution by allowing Congress to become involved in the daytoday
administration of the laws."5 Through the enabling legislation, Congress
will have already defined the goals, method, and scope of agency action;
however, through the use of the veto, Congress may be essentially ad-
ministering the law by determining which regulations shall take effect
and which shall not. When Congress originally delegates, specific relevant
facts are not available which may guide agency activity. The legislative
veto allows substantive manipulation of administrative determinations as
such relevant factors do become known. 6 This is no more sanctioned by
the Constitution than are the legislative aspects of the veto.
4 7
and self-interest over the general interest. These tendencies were dealt with by
assuring that representational interests would be expressed only through the insti-
tutional filter of bicameralism and by placing limitations on the powers of individ-
ual legislators.
Watson, supra note 16, at 1033.
11 See Dixon, supra note 21, at 449; Ivanhoe, Congressional Oversight of Administrative
Discretion: Defining the Proper Role of the Legislative Veto, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 1018, 1033-
34 (1977).
" See Watson, supra note 16, at 1037-42. A related concern is that this administrative
function conflicts with article I, § 6 of the Constitution which holds broadly that a congress-
man may not hold a federal public office. To allow a congressman to "administer" the laws
would subject him to a conflict of interest. See supra note 44. By permitting a congressman
to manipulate laws as they are formed by agencies would subject the government to the
susceptibility of a self-interested legislature, which would further limit the power of individ-
ual Congressmen. Therefore, it becomes necessary to demand that separate individuals per-
form these functions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
47 The question which arises in relation to these constitutional questions is whether,
through the use of the legislative veto, Congress is really usurping powers properly reserved
for another branch, or whether the legislature has merely retained a portion of the power it
has delegated. Once Congress delegates power to the executive branch, the determination
must be made whether it can interfere with subsequent tasks that stem from that power.
Theoretically, this would mean that Congress was redelegating power back to itself. Henry,
supra note 10, at 753. See also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957
(4th ed. 1957) (if Congress can delegate power to others, there is no persuasive reason why it
cannot redelegate it to itself). It is questionable, indeed, whether this course of action is
actually permissible. On one hand, as long as "the power" (to deal with any particular area)
remains in congressional hands, it is "legislative" in character. However, once it is delegated,
that power ceases to be legislative and becomes executive, and any subsequent congressional
attempt to interfere with the execution and administration of that power constitutes a bla-
tant violation of the Constitution. But see Cooper & Cooper, supra note 16, at 493 (nothing
happens substantively or qualitatively to the power once delegated by Congress which ren-
ders it improperly legislative; whatever the subject, it was, and remains, a proper subject for
legislative action). However, it seems that whether the legislature is exercising a power prop-
erly theirs is essentially irrelevant as, either way, according to the veto's opponents, Con-
gress is exercising a lawmaking function without following the guidelines set down in the
Constitution.
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C. Prior Decisional Law
The answer to the debate is curious, at best. While the advocates of the
veto fought to preserve a device which they perceived as indispensable,
the opponents were equally unrelenting. Both arguments have their mer-
its. Though the constitutional arguments are persuasive, for a great
length of time they were inadequate to mandate the destruction of a de-
vice so necessary to deal with the growth of the bureaucracy.
Until June of 1983, the courts were loath to render a decision on the
issue. When confronted with the issue, courts twice had disposed of cases
challenging the veto without deciding the merits, ' and twice they had
severed the veto provision from the challenged statute.'8 Only once has
the Supreme Court neared a decision as to whether the legislative veto
was constitutionally permissible. Although the issue was not decided di-
rectly, Justice White, in dissent, commented on the veto's validity in
Buckley v. Valeo: 0
I would be much more concerned if Congress purported to usurp
the functions of law enforcement, to control the outcome of par-
ticular adjudications, or to preempt the President's appointment
power; but in the light of history and modern reality, the provi-
sion for congressional disapproval of agency regulations does not
appear to transgress the constitutional design, at least where the
President has agreed to legislation establishing the disapproval
procedure or the legislation has been passed over his veto.5"
Justice White would prove to be in the minority when the issue was
11 See, e.g., McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1011 (1978) (In a constitutional challenge of a provision of the Federal Pay Compara-
bility Act of 1967, where one House had vetoed presidential recommendations for executive
schedule salaries, it was determined that the veto provision was not severable and therefore
recovery was precluded. Based on this conclusion, the court declined to consider the consti-
tutionality of this veto); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) aff'd mer. sub nor., Clark
v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977) (A challenge to the one-House veto of certain statutory
provisions allowing legislative review of Federal Election Commission decisions was dis-
missed as unripe since Congress had not yet exercised the veto).
19 See e.g., Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1977) (determining that certain federal judges were not entitled to additional compensation
claimed under the Constitution); Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont.
1982) (challenging both a clause authorizing unilateral action of a House Committee and an
order of the Secretary of the Interior purporting to withdraw wilderness areas from mineral
exploration and leasing).
1* 424 U.S. at 1. This challenge concerned an attack on powers delegated to the Federal
Election Commission as well as certain rules which were subject to a one-House veto. While
the constitutional question was considered not to be ripe, the Court limited its decision to
the propriety of the Commission and thereby determined that the defective appointment of
the members of the Commission precluded them from exercising the challenged rulemaking
powers, including the one-House veto.




squarely confronted for the first time in Chadha v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service. 2
Though the Chadha decision finally resolved the longstanding contro-
versy, it is doubtful that the issues have been laid to rest once and for all.
The decision was predictable only to the extent that it mimicked the ar-
guments repeatedly set forth by the veto's opponents. Yet, Chadha is
thought-provoking. Throughout the analysis of the decision, the question
continuously must be addressed as to whether the decision should have
been made.
III. THE TURNING POINT: Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service"
Only twice has the Supreme Court determined that an act of Congress
trespassed upon the scope of executive powers;54 both cases were based
upon violations of specific clauses of the Constitution. Only once has the
Court considered the issue absent the violation of a specific clause.5
Chadha falls under neither one of these rigid classifications. While the
legislative veto is neither specifically sanctioned nor particularly prohib-
ited, the Court did rely on precise constitutional language in order to ra-
tionalize its decision. However, Chadha must be perceived as a novelty,
for the Court has gone beyond the four corners of the Constitution to
resolve a dispute which easily could have been left alone.
A. The Facts and Circumstances
Chadha was a challenge to the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act56 "authoriz[ing] either House of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive
branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney
General [of the United States] to allow a particular deportable alien to
remain in the United States." 7
Chadha, a native of Kenya and holder of a British passport, was law-
fully admitted into the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student
visa which expired in June of 1972.58 Deportation proceedings were initi-
" Chadha, -__ U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2765.
53 Id. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice Powell filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgement. Both Justices White and Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions with
Justice White joining in the latter opinion.
" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1 (determining that an infringement of the appointments clause
of the Constitution had occurred); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (same).
" Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (reviewing a statute that
governed control over Presidential papers).
" Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
" Chadha, - U.S. at - , 103 S. Ct. at 2767.
" In October of 1973, the district director of the INS ordered Chadha to show cause why
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ated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and a deporta-
tion hearing was held before an immigration judge in early 1974."'
Chadha admitted he was deportable, but was permitted an adjournment
to allow him time to file an application for suspension of the deportation
pursuant to section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.a0
Subsequently, the immigration judge determined that Chadha met the
statutory requirements for the suspension: he had resided in the United
States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer
extreme hardship if he were returned to his native land."' A report of the
deportation suspension was forwarded to Congress.2 Pursuant to the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, one House of Congress could, by resolu-
tion, overrule the Attorney General's deportation suspension; absent a
vote to this effect, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been
formally cancelled and he would have gained the status of a permanent
resident.6 In December of 1975, a resolution which opposed the granting
of relief to Chadha and five other aliens was introduced in the House of
Representatives.6 4 The resolution was successful, proceedings were re-
he should not be deported for overstaying his visa. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
Id. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
80 The Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982) pro-
vides in part:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the At-
torney General for suspension of deportation and-(b) is deportable under any
law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this
subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a continuous pe-
riod of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such applica-
tion and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good
moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent,
or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
61 Id.
12 Id. § 244(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982).
62 Id. § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982), allows one House of Congress to veto the
decision of the Attorney General:
In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsec-
tion-if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to
the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case
is reported either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution
stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's volun-
tary departure at this own expense under the order of deportation in the manner
provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the
House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall
cancel deportation proceedings.
(emphasis added).




opened to implement the decision, and Chadha was ordered deported.65
Chadha protested to the immigration judge and appealed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals contending that section 244(c)(2) was unconstitu-
tional." Both responded that they lacked the power to evaluate the con-
stitutionality of an act of Congress. Chadha then filed a successful peti-
tion for review with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 The court
espoused Chadha's position that Congress was, in fact, without authority
to deport Chadha.68 Specifically, Congress' determination was not valid
because of the means (the veto) by which its will was effectuated. Certio-
rari was granted by the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality
of section 244(c)(2), a legislative veto.
B. Preliminary Issues
Initially, the Court quickly disposed of a number of procedural issues
challenging its authority to reach a decision on the merits of the case.
The preliminary issues in this case deserve particular scrutiny for they
make it apparent that the case need not have been decided. This case
could have been dismissed based upon a contrary resolution of one of
these issues, thereby leading to the inexorable conclusion that the Court
believed that the controversy surrounding the legislative veto had to be
dispelled.
Congress, defending the validity of the veto provision, first asserted
that review was precluded because the provision authorizing the one-
House veto was not severable from the remainder of the statute.6 There-
fore, as a consequence, it was argued that if the veto provision failed, so
must the entire statute. If the entire statute is invalid, then the Attorney
General is initially without the authority to suspend Chadha's deporta-
tion: Chadha, even if successful, could not gain the relief he desired. The
Court explained that while a provision may be stricken unless it is appar-
ent that the legislature would not have enacted the statute without it,7"
Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and Interna-
tional Law, stated that it was his Committee's belief that these aliens did not satisfy the
statutory requirements entitling them to the relief desired. 121 CONG. REC. 40800 (1975).
The resolution was passed without debate or a recorded vote. Chadha, - U.S. at
66 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
Id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
67 The INS agreed with Chadha's contention that the Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) was unconstitutional. Id.
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 436 (9th Cir. 1980).
66 If the provision is not severable, then as Congress maintains, the entire statute would
fail. If it fails in its entirety, then the Attorney General lacks the initial authority to sus-
pend Chadha's deportation under § 244(c)(1). Therefore, this would lead to the conclusion
that Chadha has no standing to challenge this provision since, even if he were successful, he
would not be entitled to any relief.
7" Chadha, __ U.S. at __ 103 S. Ct. at 2774-75. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108
(quoting Champion Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210).
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the presence of a severability clause in the Immigration and Nationality
Act 1 created a presumption that the validity of the statute was not con-
tingent upon the application of any particular provision. The Court
stated that the clause was unambiguous: the legislature had intended the
continued vitality of the Act even if certain provisions were nullified.
72
Congress futher opposed consideration of the case maintaining that
there existed no case or controversy which would give the Supreme Court
the jurisdiction to hear the case." Since the Immigration Board of Ap-
peals, the INS, and the Ninth Circuit all espoused Chadha's position,
Congress asserted that the proceeding was nonadversarial. The Court
summarily determined that there was sufficient adverseness in that
Chadha's residential status would be affected by the outcome of the
case. 74 While true from a theoretical standpoint, the Court's resolution of
this issue is attenuated, at best." Certainly Chadha's status would be
7 A severability clause states that if any particular provision of a named statute is held
to be invalid, then the remainder shall still be enforceable. E.g., Immigration and National-
ity Act § 406, 8 U.S.C. § 1206 (1982): "If any particular provision of this Act, or the appli-
cation thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and
the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby."
" The Court justified the presumption of legislative intent in this case by deducing that
Congress had fully intended to delegate authority to the Attorney General to control depor-
tation suspensions because it was too "onerous and time consuming" to consider all of the
private deportation bills themselves. The Court interpolated that the legislative history of
this bill manifested a conclusive inference that Congress did not want to carry this burden
of responsibility. Furthermore, the Court surmised that there was "insufficient evidence"
that Congress would have desired otherwise. See Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at
2774-75. While the history may have indicated that Congress unequivocally intended to ab-
dicate this duty to the Attorney General, it seems doubtful that Congress intended to relin-
quish complete authority in this area with absolutely no avenue of recourse against a deci-
sion with which it disagreed.
71 Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
71 In order for the Supreme Court to hear any case, there must first exist a genuine case
or controversy. This is especially true when the case before the Court is challenging the
validity of an act of Congress. See e.g., Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472
(1945)(the Court will not pass on the constitutionality of legislation in a suit which is not
adversarial); Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316 (1945) (the Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of an act of Congress unless the suit is truly adversarial); Gregg Dyeing Co.
v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932) (the Court must only deal with substantial distinctions and
real injury); Chicago v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892) (decisions of constitutional questions
about an act of the legislature should not be invoked by means of an amicable suit; an
"earnest and vital" controversy is necessary). This doctrine is reinforced by numerous suits
that have been dismissed on this basis. See e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1930);
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1926); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328
(1925); Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158 (1921).
75 The Court also discarded a congressional challenge that the case presented a nonjusti-
ciable controversy since Chadha was merely challenging the congressional authority to regu-
late aliens. The Court responded that while Congress does have plenary authority over
aliens in this country under article I, § 8, clause 4 and article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Consti-




considered and affected, however, that is not the thrust of this contro-
versy. The Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of
the one-House veto. For this issue, there was no opponent. This adds to
the inescapable conclusion that the Supreme Court did not want to dis-
miss this case on the basis of a preliminary issue, but rather, sought to
render a decision on the merits.
The last critical preliminary issue was whether Chadha had available to
him alternative forms of relief.71 Chadha had married a United States
citizen in August of 1980 thus possibly earning him the classification as
an immediate relative.77 Furthermore, Chadha may also have been enti-
tled to relief under the Refugee Act of 1980.8 The Court ruled that these
alternatives were merely "speculative" and were therefore insufficient to
deny Chadha the right to challenge the veto provision. 9 Again, such a
more, merely because this question involves constitutional issues, the political question doc-
trine is not automatically invoked. See Chadha, - U.S. at __ , 103 S. Ct. at 2778. For
a complete discussion of the situations in which a political question most frequently arises,
see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). One critic has asserted that the Court's decision
in Chadha was jurisdictionally barred on the basis that it undermined the prohibition
against the issuance of advisory opinions. By merely ratifying the Attorney General's deter-
mination, the Court violated this tenant and expanded its own power. See Wallace, Ad As-
tra Sine Aspera: Chadha Transcends Adversity, 1 BENCHMARK 13 (1984).
71 A cardinal rule of the Court is that there exists a duty not to pass on a constitutional
issue at all, however narrowly confined, if the case may as a matter of intellectual honesty,
be decided on other grounds or be avoided. Rosenberg v. Flueti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Bush v.
State, 372 U.S. 586 (1963); Garner v. State, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Communist Party, U.S.A. v.
Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961); Clay v. Sun Inc. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Petite v.
United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); Kovacs v. Brewer, 355 U.S. 604 (1958); Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); United States v. U.A.W.-C.I.O., 352 U.S. 567, reh'g denied,
352 U.S. 943 (1957); Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S.
331 (1955); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Judging by this partial, yet persuasive history, it would appear logical that if at
all possible the Court would seek to dismiss any case challenging a legislative enactment. It
is curious that the Court here defied this canon, sidestepped all of the preliminary issues,
and chose to deal with the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
71 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201(b), 204, 245, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1253, 1255
(1982).
" Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C. (1982)). The Act provides that the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum
and permanent residence to any alien who is unable to return to his country because of a
"well-founded fear of persecution on account of race." Chadha contended that due to his
Kenyan nationality and British citizenship, return to his native land would in fact, produce
undue hardship. See Appellant's Brief at 5, Chadha v. INS, __ U.S. __ , 103 S. Ct.
2764 (1983).
71 Chadha, U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2776. Note, however, that while this deci-
sion is favorable and sympathetic to Chadha's position, it ignores the tenant that constitu-
tional adjudication should be avoided whenever possible. In fact, there is no evidence in the
opinion which reveals whether Chadha even attempted to pursue any other forms of relief.
Given the fact that three years had passed between Chadha's marriage and the Court's deci-
sion, one begins to wonder whether the alternative forms of relief were really as speculative
as the Court might have us believe.
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cursory disposition of an issue which could have precluded a decision on
the merits, deserves consideration. Although these other forms of relief
may have been "speculative" as stated by the Court, it is surprising that
Chadha was not compelled to pursue these remedies before resorting to
the Supreme Court for assistance.
When this decision of the Court is compared with the earlier cases
which challenged the veto and which were all dismissed without a deci-
sion on the merits, it becomes obvious that the Court, in this instance,
did not want to avoid this determination. Though the resolution of the
preliminary issues may not always be dispositive of the outcome of a par-
ticular controversy, they may affect the future treatment of this decision.
If the Supreme Court strained to find that this case was properly before
the Court, it may be possible that this decision is limited to these particu-
lar facts. If this is true, then perhaps the rationale for striking down the
legislative veto may be confined to this case. Furthermore, if there did,
indeed, exist an alternative, narrower ground upon which to decide this
case, then it is conceivable that future litigation concerning the legislative
veto could be resolved by reliance upon these narrower grounds without
consideration of the central constitutional issue. That is to say, a court
faced with the same facts could dismiss a case based upon a stricter ap-
plication of jurisdictional bars and could thereby allow a challenged veto
to stand.
C. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Burger's solution to the puzzle of the one-House veto is
quite simple and basically traditional, adhering to the arguments set
forth by the opponents of the veto since its inception. While acknowledg-
ing that the legislative veto is a frequently used and an efficiently em-
ployed device, Chief Justice Burger rejected the argument that conve-
nience or utility could sustain the veto in the face of explicit and
unambiguous constitutional provisions which proscribe its use. "[P]olicy
arguments supporting even useful 'political inventions' are subject to the
demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets out just
how those powers are to be exercised."80
The heart of the majority opinion relies heavily upon the construction
of the doctrine of the separation of powers.8 1 The Constitution delineates
specific procedural guidelines to be respected when exercising the powers
conferred. These are not intended to be circumvented; "The principle of
separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the
8* Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
81 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 and § 7, cl. 2 and 3. These provisions enumerate the basic
legislative powers conferred. While the doctrine of the separation of powers is not specifi-
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minds of Framers." ' Any extra-legislative procedure utilized in contra-
vention of the doctrine would be thoroughly unjustifiable.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that one of the funda-
mental requisites to the enactment of a law is presentment to the Presi-
dent. The Court declared that the legislative veto was inconsistent with
this requirement since it avoided involvement of the President in the leg-
islative process after the veto had been exercised. The intent of the Fram-
ers of the Constitution gives meaning to this procedural design. The ra-
tionale behind the presentment clause that the President must retain a
defensive weapon against potential legislative abuses of power, that his
involvement serves as a check against "oppressive, improvident, or illcon-
sidered measures," and that it assures the input of one elected by a na-
tional constituencybolsters the meaning behind the language of the Con-
stitution. 3 Since the legislative powers were those most easily and apt to
be abused, the principle of presentment was "uniformly accepted" by the
Framers.
8 4
The Court determined that the veto also contravenes the bicameral re-
quirements of the Constitution; specifically, no law may be passed with-
out the approval of a majority of both Houses of Congress. 5 Bicamera-
82 Chadha, -U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2781 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124).
The Court emphasized that although the separation of powers was originally adopted by the
Framers as a reaction against the despotism which they had previously experienced, the
doctrine continues to maintain it vitality.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention
imposes burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient,
even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had
lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to
go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court
for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in
complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided either by the
Congress or the President.
Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2768. However, it is argued that even though the
separation of powers is a vital doctrine deserving of respect, it is nonetheless not a rigid
concept devoid of any flexibility. "But [the Framers] likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off
of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of
a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122. See also Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co., 434 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The actual art of gov-
erning under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the
power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contem-
plates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It en-
joins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
Springer, 277 U.S. at 209 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The great ordinances of the Constitu-
tion do not establish and divide fields of black and white."). It therefore should be asked
whether the legislative veto is truly violative of the separation of powers or whether it is
really compatible with them. See infra note 101.
8 Chadho, __ U.S. at _ , 103 S. Ct. at 2782. See supra note 34.
" Chadha, __ U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2782.
88 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2783.
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lism assures careful and concerted consideration by the legislature, it
satisfies the "need to divide and disperse power in order to protect lib-
erty", and it serves to protect the respective interests of the large and
small states, as well as local and national constituencies."'
The Court concluded that the bicameral and presentment requirements
are interrelated and essential constitutional functions. Both were exhaus-
tively considered and were determined to be indispensable to the Ameri-
can system of government. While not every legislative action of each
House is subject to bicameralism and presentment, when intended spe-
cific exemptions are enumerated in the Constitution.8 7 Essentially, how-
ever, it is the type of action sought to be exercised that defines the need
for adherence to the constitutional procedures. Since only "legislative"
acts demand conformity, 8 the critical question before the Court was
whether the legislative veto constituted a legislative act. 9 The true deter-
mination will depend on whether the veto has the purpose and effect of
legislation. The Court concluded that since the exercise of the veto funda-
mentally altered the "legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, includ-
ing the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials, and Chadha," it was
essentially legislative in nature."0 Such an effort must be effected through
the constitutionally prescribed process. Absent the one-House veto provi-
sion, neither House, acting alone or together, could have required the At-
torney General to deport Chadha after he had determined that Chadha
could remain; it could only have been performed through a legislative en-
actment.8 1 One House cannot, therefore, be permitted to do what two to-
gether would be prohibited from carrying out. Such "legislating," accord-
ing to the Court, surely does not conform to the Constitution and
congressional authority cannot be implied to this extent.92
" For support that the bicameral clauses were an integral part of the scheme of the
separation of powers, the Court relied on the words of Alexander Hamilton.
It [bicameralism] establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated
to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitency, or of any im-
pulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of
that body. . . The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon
the Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase
the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad law through
haste, inadvertance, or design.
Chadha, -- U.S. at __ , 103 S. Ct. at 2783 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 458
(A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
87 Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See supra note 42.
" See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
89 Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2785.
The Court explained that "whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact,
an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon whether they contain
matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in character and effect." Id. at 2784
(quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897)). See supra note 32.





Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion has a solid traditional cast, en-
compassing all of the conventional arguments set forth by the opponents
of the veto. In this respect, it is the perfect vehicle for the invalidation of
the legislative veto. Nevertheless, such an argument may not be quite so
flawless when applied to the facts of Chadha. The day-to-day use of the
veto usually operates as a legislative mechanism.s3 The veto generally af-
fects potential rules of general applicability. This sort of rulemaking is
certainly circumscribed by the Court. However, the veto which was uti-
lized in Chadha was not one that yielded a "legislative" effect. The veto
utilized in Chadha involved a limited group of individuals whose rights
and duties as potential citizens would be altered: the decision of the
House constituted an essentially adjudicatory funtion. As a result, the
concurring opinion of Justice Powell is a sounder basis for the Chadha
decision.
D. The Powell Concurrence: The Better Basis
Justice Powell's concurrence parallels the opinion of the majority in
that they both derive their conclusions from the doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers." Justice Powell stated that while the Constitution does
not delineate the precise boundries for the exercise of powers, the doc-
trine may be functionally violated in one of two ways:95 one branch may
"impermissibly interfere" with a constitutionally assigned function of an-
other," or one branch may "assume a function more properly entrusted
93 The Court emphasized the legislative character of the veto in this case by pointing out
that in the absence of § 244(c)(2) (the veto provision), neither the Senate nor the House
acting alone or together, could require the Attorney General to reverse a decision allowing
an alien to remain in the United States. After the Attorney General, pursuant to his dele-
gated authority, has made such a decision any attempt to overturn it cannot be accom-
plished by anything less than full legislation. The legislative nature of the veto was futher
substantiated by the fact that Congress chose to delegate the authority to the executive
branch to allow deportable aliens to remain in the country.
Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deporta-
tion-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress' origi-
nal choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that deci-
sion, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one
way: bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President. Congress must
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or
revoked.
Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
0' Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2789.
95 See supra note 28.
91 Justice Powell asserted that by determining that one particular individual does not
satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in the United States, the legislature
had assumed a judicial function in violation of the separation of powers. Since the determi-
nation of Chadha's status as a deportable alien was specific, limited to unique facts, in-
volved a closed class of individuals, concered liability based on past conduct, and imposed
sanction without further proceedings, this proceeding was essentially adjudicatory as op-
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to another." The legislative veto is characteristic of the latter example.
Essentially, the veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act
allowed Congress to usurp a judicial function9" by allowing the legislature
to adjudicate individual rights." Therefore, while the veto at issue does
violate the separation of powers doctrine, it is not because the legislature
encroached on executive powers. Rather, it is because Congress exercised
a function that was more properly placed within the province of the
judiciary.
While the majority opinion seems to circumscribe any veto that contra-
venes the bicameral or presentment clauses of the Constitution, Justice
Powell's concurrence does not sweep so broadly. This concurrence is nar-
rowly confined to the invalidity of the veto exercised in Chadha: nowhere
does Justice Powell state that all legislative vetoes are invalid. Rather, he
is careful to point out that adherence to this narrower ground for decision
could have avoided the breadth of the majority opinion.9
As expressed in Justice Powell's concurrence, this case could have been
decided on narrower grounds and thus could have avoided the majority's
sweeping condemnation of the legislative veto. Justice Powell's opinion
reinforces the conclusion that the majority ignored one of the "cardinal
principlels] of statutory construction" that is "to save and not to de-
stroy," and that the Court should avoid passing on questions of the con-
stitutionality of acts of Congress whenever it is possible to reach a deci-
sion on alternative grounds.' The hasty resolution of the preliminary
issues further confirms this conclusion. Though this deduction may not
appear critical to the issue of this case, it may influence future controver-
sies that take this decision into account. When these principles of consti-
tutional construction are taken in conjunction with Justice Powell's nar-
rower grounds for decision, future decisions may not be so broad. That is,
courts may abide by the above-stated rules and extrapolate that the
Court did not intend to "destroy," but to "save," and that since the Court
did not state the breadth of the opinion and its applications, Chadha, as
stated by Justice Powell, was limited to the particular facts at issue. This
analysis is not quite as distasteful as the conclusion that the Supreme
Court in Chadha purposefully avoided these "cardinal principles" in or-
posed to legislative. A legislative proceeding would have prescribed rules of general applica-
bility for future conduct as well as relative certainty for future expectations. See also Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 798 (discussing the traditional distinctions between legislation and
adjudication).
" In support of this proposition, Justice Powell stated: "Their [the Framers] concern
that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one
person... provides still another reason not to ignore the separation of powers." Chadha,
__ U.S. at _ , 103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring).
98 Id.
" Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2793.
'o Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685 (1971)(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin




der to render a broad and overwhelming annihilation of all legislative
vetoes.
Despite the unmistakable conclusions that the majority purposefully
rendered a decision on the constitutionality of the veto, the fact still re-
mains that use of the legislative veto may no longer be allowed.'"' Dissat-
isfaction with the Court's decision will not resolve the troublesome ques-
tion that now faces the legislaturewhere do we go from here?
IV. AFTER Chadha
A. The Ramifications of the Decision
A preliminary examination of Chadha could conceivably yield the con-
clusion that it was a narrow decision that proscribed merely the use of a
one-House veto in deportation cases. Such an attitude however, may be
misplaced. Although the majority opinion never explicitly states the in-
tended applications of the decision, both Justice Powell and Justice
White left no room for doubt that the Chadha decision "not only invali-
dates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds
the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Con-
gress has reserved a 'legislative veto."1 0 2 Undeniably, the first unan-
swered question is whether all legislative veto provisions are truly invalid.
Since the majority avoided a direct determination of this issue, the possi-
bility still existed that the two House vetoes could survive.10° Seemingly,
101 Justice White's dissent was similarly loyal to past arguments as was Chief Justice Bur-
ger's majority opinion. Arguments presented in opposition to the decision virtually parallel
those asserted by the veto's advocates. After giving a brief history of the legislative veto,
Justice White stated that this device is too useful to thoroughly discard. He refused to be-
lieve that a device so long accepted and utilized by the government could now be held un-
constitutional. Justice White did not view the legislative veto as a legislative act that func-
tions outside of the framework of the Constitution, rather, he relied on the arguments urged
historically by the proponents of the veto in determining that it is merely a necessary and
efficient check on the power that Congress has delegated. See Chadha, __ U.S. at _
103 S. Ct. 2792-2811. Justice White also joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Justice Rehn-
quist contended that the legislative veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act was not
severable from its statutory framework. Explaining that Congress did not intend to relin-
quish all control were the veto provision to be excised from the Act, Justice Rehnquist
stated that Chadha could not gain relief no matter the outcome of the controversy. Id. __
U.S. at - , 103 S. Ct. at 2816. See also supra note 69.
102 Chadha, - U.S. at --- , 2792 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also shared
this sentiment: "The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses...apparently will
invalidate every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause.
Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back to the 1930's."
__ U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2788. (Powell J., concurring).
103 One critic of the Court's decision has suggested that there existed a narrower ground
for decision which was apparently not evaluated by the Court. Considering the varying uses
of the veto-internal government control (i.e., structure, budget, and impoundment), depor-
tation, and oversight of agency activity, to name a few-the Court should have distinguished
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the debate was quickly resolved when, shortly after the decision, the
Court summarily affirmed two lower court decisions, one of which struck
down the twoHouse veto of a Federal Trade Commission regulation. 104
Initially, these decisions would seem to indicate that all legislative veto
provisions are inoperative. Yet, it cannot be forgotten that the majority
did not address this issue; perhaps this leaves a gray area still ripe for
resolution. If the Chadha decision was tenuously resolved after an inade-
quate determination of the preliminary issues, then the Court may have
left open avenues of recourse. If the Court strained to make sure that this
case was properly before them, then perhaps it is because the decision
was peculiarily limited to the facts of this particular case. Thus, the Court
may have purposefully left the determination of the validity of other veto
provisions to the courts in order that they apply the Chadha rationale in
a case-by-case method.
Such an alternative would be unexpectedly appealing to the legislature.
Were the courts to apply the Chadha decision in a case-by-case method,
several possibilities for avoiding the decision could arise. First, the deci-
sion could be limited to the particular facts of Chadha (and the subse-
quent decisions). Second, challengers could be denied access to the courts
based on a contrary resolution of the preliminary issues. If the legislative
veto, or a device similar in operation, were to be exercised in the future,
any individual challenging its use could be limited by problems of stand-
ing, alternative relief, or existence of a true case or controversy. The ma-
jority's decision would probably not be overturned solely on the basis of
the resolution of the preliminary issues, yet its force could be diminished.
Since constitutional issues should not be resolved unless no adequate
grounds for alternative decision exist, any future determination could
show that a narrower option did exist as asserted by Justice Powell. Fi-
nally, a future decision could circumscribe the rationale asserted by the
majority in favor of that utilized by Justice Powell in order to narrow the
breadth of the decision. When this possibility is coupled with the cursory
resolution of the preliminary issues, it raises the distinct possibility that
Chadha might not be able to survive future scrutiny.
If the Court's decision in Chadha does invalidate all use of any legisla-
tive veto, then the problems that the Court has engendered are essen-
tially twofold. First, there exists literally hundreds of statutes with legis-
lative veto mechanisms. It is unclear what will happen to these laws now.
It is both impractical and impossible for Congress to reconsider each and
every statute to determine whether they remain valid absent the veto
among the different uses of the veto and reserved consideration for the uses not presented
by Chadha. See Comment, supra note 4.
"o' Consumer's Union, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), aff'd, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983) (striking down a two-House veto of an FTC regulation); Consumer Energy
Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983)




provision. So, the question to be answered is whether the veto provision is
severable from its statutory framework while allowing the remainder to
survive. However, even if the vetoes are severable, "[tihe fact that the
Supreme Court has handed down its opinion that the veto is unconstitu-
tional does not alter or dilute the original rationale which pursuaded Con-
gress to adopt and utilize the veto in the first place. The . . . issue is,
who shall write the laws of the land?"'' 10 Hence, the second dilema posed
by the Court's decision: if Congress is to continue to delegate authority to
agencies and the executive branchwhich is both inevitable and impera-
tivehow can it continue to retain the degree of control it maintained via
the legislative veto?
Congressional response to Chadha generally has not been commenda-
tory.10 6 Congress has interpreted the Court's decision to mean that the
legislative veto may no longer be enforced.0 7 However, in a curious turn
of events Congress has passed statutes since the decision that have em-
bodied legislative vetoes.'0 6 Such a paradox creates more of a quandry.
Nevertheless, congressional commentaries have indicated that the legisla-
tive veto should be replaced by new ways to monitor delegated power.0 9
To date, no uniform solution has been accepted.
The problems are complex. First, we do not know conclusively whether
all uses of the legislative veto are invalid. Second, if they are, there are no
solutions at hand. Finally, it is not at all clear whose problem it is now. It
is quite conceivable that the problem has been returned to the legislature
in order that it both decide what to do with the existing statutes and how
105 129 CONG. REC. 10476 (daily ed. July 20, 1983) (floor statement of Senator Grassley).
100 The Chadha decision was assaulted most harshly by Stanley Brand, Counsel for the
House of Representatives: "It took the Court 18 months to screw up what it took the Con-
gress 50 years to set up." 1983 CONG. Q. 1327 (weekly report July 2, 1983).
07 See infra note 109.
108 See e.g., Department of Transporation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-78, 97 Stat. 453 (1983); Caribbean Basin Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat.
384 (1983); Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301 (1983); Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-52, 97 Stat. 281 (1983);
Independent Agencies and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-45, 97 Stat. 219 (1983). How-
ever, any act of Congress which defies a constitutional mandate shall have no validty.
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135
(1921); Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880); United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508 (1878).
109 See 1983 CONG. Q. 1264 (weekly report June 25, 1983). "The Court's decision drew a
mixed reaction in Congress, but most members agreed that they will have to re-examine and
probably rewrite laws that contain legislative veto provisions." As a result,
It]he Court's [sic] ruling set off an across-the-board inventory of existing laws
with veto provisions. Congressional committees were expected to sit down to re-
view the laws within their jurisdictions that contain such provisions and to confer
with the appropriate executive branch officials to ascertain the practical impact of
the Court's [sic] ruling.
Id. at 1263.
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to control delegated power in the future. Representative Jacobs most
probably voiced the opinion of congressmen generally by stating: "When
an unelected Supreme Court decides that an unelected bureaucracy has
more to say than Congress in determining what Congress means when it
passes a law, it is time for Congress . to clear things up on behalf of
the people.""'
Yet, the courts may not be helpless. They may be able to evaluate on a
case-by-case basis whether particular vetoes are severable or whether, ab-
sent the veto, the entire statute must fail. Furthermore, if no Congres-
sional response is forthcoming, the courts may have no choice but to indi-
vidually determine the validity of the statutes in question. The only thing
that remains clear at this point is that nothing is clear.
B. Severability and the Future of the Existing Statutes
The unconstitutionality of a part of an act does not necessarily
defeat . . . the validity of its remaining provisions. Unless it is
evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provi-
sions which are within its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully opera-
tive as law."'
The Court has, in the past, determined that certain portions of a stat-
ute are unconstitutional while allowing the remainder of the law to re-
main effective. However the Court has never before invalidated a provi-
sion in a multitude of laws. While the Court has been amenable to
excising certain provisions in the past, the problem now exists whether
every legislative veto provision (if they are, in fact, all invalid) may be
severed from its statutory framework. No previous decision has legiti-
mized so comprehensive a scheme.
The traditional test for severability takes two factors into account.
First, if a provision is deleted, what remains must be fully operative as
law.1 12 Laws that embody a legislative veto comply with this requirement.
When Congress exercises its veto power, it is essentially barring a law
from taking effect. Absent the legislative prerogative, a law would be en-
acted. The presence of the veto provision (or its absence) does not leave
the original legislative scheme incomplete. The veto is merely an adden-
110 1983 CONG. Q. 1328 (weekly report July 2, 1983)(statement of Representative Andrew
Jacobs).
' United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570. 585 (1968) (quoting Champion Ref. Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-90
(1924).
"I See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570 (declaring that a death penalty clause imposed an imper-
missible burden on the exercise of a constitutional right and was therefore severable);
Champion Ref. Co., 286 U.S. at 210 (determining that a price fixing law was void under the




dum to the scheme, not to the law that the agency is seeking to promul-
gate. While the veto mechanism may have been included to effectuate a
congressional preference, its absence does not render the original delega-
tion, or the laws promulgated pursuant to it, a nullity." '1 Severing the
veto from the enabling legislation of a delegation would parallel a delega-
tion of power that never had a veto provision in the first place. In other
words, its presence does not alter the manner in which an agency exer-
cises its power and its absence does not affect the statute's ability to
function as a law.
The second facet of the severability test may not be so easily dismissed.
A statute will generally be allowed to stand after a portion of it has been
severed only if the legislature would have enacted it absent the objection-
able provision."' Courts dictate that the best way to resolve this is to
examine the legislative history of each particular statute in order to de-
termine how critical to the enactment the provision was viewed to be. By
so requiring an examination of the legislative history of a statutory
scheme, a solution will be, at best, guesswork. Rather than an analysis of
legislative intent, such speculation would be better classified as an exer-
cise in statutory construction. It is impractical to believe that an ad hoc
examination by the judiciary could determine exactly which portions of a
statute Congress intended to be indispensable.
Usually the most persuasive indicator of Congressional intent of this
sort is gleaned from the presence or absence of a severability clause.' 5
Since this clause is woven into the framework of the statute, a presump-
tion is created that "the legislature would have been satisfied with what
remained and that the scheme of regulation deriveable from the other
provisions would have been enacted without regard to [the deleted por-
tions]." 116 Such an interpretation is both logical and expedient in deter-
mining legislative intent; however, such language is not always conclusive.
The existence or the nonexistence of a severability clause does not always
dictate the disposition of a statute that has been declared partially inva-
lid." 7 Certainly, on occasion, courts have been predisposed to make their
" See supra note 16.
114 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 586.
"I A severability clause states that if any portion of the statute is invalid, then the re-
mainder shall continue to be operative. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
", Champion Rel. Co., 286 U.S. at 235. See also J. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
(1st ed. 1868) (the test for severability is whether the legislature would have enacted the law
absent the clause).
' The Court has often allowed a statute to remain valid despite the fact that a provision
has been excised in the absence of a severability clause. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971) reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971); Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n.27. Therefore, while
the presence of such a clause creates a presumption of severability, its absence does not
necessarily do so. If in the Court's discretion, the elimination of the clause in no way alters
the substantive reach of the statute and further does not alter its basic operation, the ab-
sence of the clause may be ignored. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 586. But see Carter v. Carter Coal
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own interpretations, regardless of the language of the statute. Judges may
evaluate the merits of a particular statute and so decide whether or not to
sustain its validity, rather than applying "the principles which are always
said to determine severability."' 9 Regardless of any well established rule,
the decision is fundamentally a matter of judicial discretion.
Previous applications of the "severability test" are unavailing when em-
ployed to solve the dilema at issue. In all previous situations, the Court
was examining individual provisions of statutes in particular adjudica-
tions, such as Chadha. In each, the courts were able to scrutinize the
legislative histories of the statutes in question and therefore render a de-
cision which was consistent with the facts of each case. However, it is
conceivable that the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha has rendered
hundreds of provisions in a variety of statutes invalid. If the severability
test were to be applied to the issue at hand, it could mean that all legisla-
tive vetoes acrosstheboard would be blindly severed. To say that the leg-
islative veto is no longer valid, and therefore all such provisions hereto-
fore shall be disregarded, is untenable. Some statutes most certainly
would not have been enacted absent a veto provision' 9 and a determina-
tion of this breadth could not take these individual differences into
account.
Furthermore, if it were to be decided that all existing vetoes were to be
eliminated while allowing the remainder of the legislation to continue, it
is unclear who would make this determination. Since the Court left it
uncertain exactly how far-reaching the decision is in the first place, it
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 322 (1936) ("[W]hen Congress states that the provisions of the Act are
not inseparable and that the invalidity of any provision shall not affect others, we should
not hold that the provisions are inseparable unless their nature, by reasons of an inextrica-
ble tie, demands that conclusion.").
,' Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REv.
76, 114 (1937). For a partial listing of specific statutes in which the Court has and has not
allowed a provision to be severed, see id. at 106-108.
"I Two such examples include major tools of foreign policy. Although the Congress has
never utilized either of these "tools," their existence has been used to force the President
both to consult with the legislature and to accept compromises. These two statutes which
embody the veto provisions are the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973), and
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2776(b) (1981). The War Powers Resolution allows Congress, via a concurrent resolution,
to force the withdrawal of U.S. troops who are engaged in foreign hostilitites without con-
gressional authorization. The Arms Control Act allows the Congress to veto major arms
sales, by a concurrent resolution, within thirty days of receiving notification from the Presi-
dent. Although no use of the veto has been occasioned by either one of these statutes, it is
questionable whether either would have been enacted absent the provision. This is well-
illustrated by the War Powers Resolution. Enacted primarily in response to the war in Viet
Nam, it indicated a pervasive legislative intent not to allow the President to avoid the "war
power". See 1983 CONG. Q. 1265 (weekly report June 25, 1983). For a discussion of whether
the War Powers Resolution is currently valid, see Moore, The War Powers Resolution... of
Doubtful Constitutionality, 70 A.B.A. J. 10 (1984); Tipson, The War Powers Resolu-




would be inconsistent to extrapolate that Chadha meant to sever all veto
provisions. Yet to expect the legislature, the defender of the veto, to ex-
cise all legislative vetoes when the necessity of such an exercise is as yet
unclear, is unrealistic. Therefore, while severance of all existing veto pro-
visions would lend a quick and easy solution to a difficult problem, such
an option is doubtful and impractical, at best.
C. Judicial Resolutions of Severability
The answer to the questions raised by Chadha could be resolved by the
judiciary. Rather than disposing of all veto provisions by expeditiously
severing them from their statutory frameworks, it is conceivable that each
provision could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. An individual who
seeks relief by way of a particular statute that embodies a legislative veto
could resort to the courts in order to determine whether the veto is sever-
able or whether the whole statute must fail.
Consider hypothetically Mr. Jones who is entitled to monetary compen-
sation by Agency A because he produced twice the quota of wheat in a
farming incentive program. The enabling legislation of agency A states,
however, that all determinations by the agency, including monetary re-
wards, are subject to a final determination by the legislature, i.e., a legis-
lative veto. Therefore, Mr. Jones seeks compensation under a statutory
scheme that contains a (presumptively) invalid provision. Mr. Jones now
does not know whether only that provision is ineffective or whether the
entire compensation scheme is invalid. When an individual, such as Mr.
Jones, seeks relief under a statute that presently embodies a veto, there
exist two alternatives. Agency A may refuse to grant the relief, contenting
that the mere presence of a veto renders the entire statute invalid. Mr.
Jones could then resort to the courts to determine whether, in fact, the
veto is severable and relief is available nonetheless. Due to the individual-
ized nature of this challenge, the particular legislative history could be
examined to determine the viability of the statutory scheme absent the
veto. The other possibility is that agency A may ignore the veto provision
and grant the relief. Mr. Jones will surely not complain to the courts and
the statute may, in effect, be operating as if there were no veto present at
all. In essence, no decision will have been rendered as to the viability of
the particular statutory scheme and certain statutes may be unaffected
by any ramifications of Chadha. Thus, if this hypothetical follows, the
severability of legislative vetoes will only be determined when challenged
by injured parties.
The disadvantages of the option of a case-by-case adjudication, how-
ever, far outweigh its utility. It is unavoidable that inconsistent decisions
will result. A statute may be sustained in one court, while in the next
jurisdiction, the very same law is being limited. The absence of any guide-
lines given the Court leave lower courts to formulate their own tests
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which inevitably will differ.12 0 Furthermore, the process of reviewing indi-
vidual cases under statutes which contain legislative vetoes will be costly,
time-consuming, and inefficient."' The endless appeals to higher courts
challenging these inconsistent decisions would not only inundate an al-
ready overburdened judiciary, but would also indefinitely postpone any
expedient relief to otherwise eligible litigants.
This unappealing alternative raises the question of whether the judici-
ary is the proper body to handle this problem. Should Chadha invalidate
all use of the legislative veto, the breadth of the decision could be over-
whelming. The risks attendant to a judicial solution for a problem of this
scope emphasize its drawbacks. Perhaps, then, it is the legislature that
would be the proper body to solve this problem. Logic dictates that if
Congress originally incorporated the legislative veto into a statutory
scheme to render the agencies accountable,1 2 2 it would be quite reluctant
to relinquish this privilege. By allowing the courts to determine the via-
bility of the existing statutes embodying the veto provision, Congress
runs the risk that it may lose this control. Congress may be best suited to
make the next move in order to minimize this danger, to maximize consis-
tency, and to expedite and answer.
D. A Congressional Response
Immediately following the Court's decision, Congress commenced its
search for an answer."2 The invalidation of all veto provisions creates two
questions that the legislature will have to settle: (1) what should be done
with the existing statutes; and (2) how Congress can maintain a suitable
method of accountability with the agencies for the future. The solution
20 The first decision rendered subsequent to Chadha manifested a radical reaction. In
Allstate Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983), the Mississippi Dis-
trict Court ruled that a one-House veto in a reorganization act was unconstitutional even
when not exercised. The court held that the one-House veto was not severable and therefore
determined that the entire act was unconstitutional. The Court rationalized that Chadha
"sweeps with a broad stroke." Id. at 1229. This ruling is demonstrative of the problems that
the Court's decision may have propagated. Not only did this court invalidate an entire stat-
ute, but it is conceiveable that while it did, other courts similarly situated might uphold it,
thereby giving rise to a statute of overall questionable status. Identical treatment of other
laws could create havoc. See Smith & Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative
Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1261 (1983).
... Inconsistent lower court decisions or ruling which invalidate entire statutes invariably
will be subject to a long and burdensome appeals process. Resolution could take years, dur-
ing which time litigants could be totally barred from relief. Furthermore, this could stale-
mate the administrative process as well since the agencies may be operating under statutes
of dubious validity, a "let's wait and see" attitude does not appear to be the appropriate
course of action in this situation. There must be some sort of specific guidance given to the
agencies and the lower courts to assist in the resolution of the questions. Without it, lower
court decisions and administrative functioning could be irratic, inconsistent, and unavailing.
1 See supra note 118.




may be axiomatic. Assuming that it is not an agreeable alternative to
sever all veto provisions from every existing statute while allowing the
remainder to stand, 12 4 Congress must devise a suitable alternative to the
veto. Therefore, the most palpable solution is for the Congress to find a
substitute "mechanism" that comports with the constitutional mandates
as expressed by the Chadha decision to replace the legislative veto in all
existing statutes and future delegations." 6 By technically repealing en
masse all legislative vetoes and simultaneously replacing them with a le-
gitimate device, the original legislative intent will be preserved. A de-
tailed and explicit enactment specifying every provision which was to be
replaced may be required initially. While such a procedure may be unor-
thodox as well as somewhat overbearing, its practicality may justify its
novelty.
The search has begun for a statutory or nonstatutory mechanism that
may directly overturn, prohibit, amend, or terminate proposed executive
or administrative actions. The task is not as overwhelming as it seems
because the legislative veto was only one of many oversight mechanisms
considered in the past.1 26 Yet, while proposals for alternative oversight
devices abound, 2 7 none have been accepted and no resolution has been
reached.
1. Direct Override or Preemption12
The simplest mechanism by which Congress could overturn an objec-
tionable executive or administrative rule is by the enactment of a statute
which specifically revokes the proposed rule or preempts the area from
consideration. Such a procedure would require review and approval of the
reversal (or preemption) by both Houses of Congress as well as present-
14 A bill was proposed in the Senate on July 12, 1983 suggesting that a commission be
formulated to deal with this question.
S. 1591 is designed to alleviate that concern by clearing away the confusion that
has followed in the wake of the Court's decision. This legislation will create a
commission to study the full consequences of Chadha and suggest procedures
under which Congress may continue to exercise adequate oversight of action by
the executive branch.
This legislation is by no means an attempt to subvert either the authority of the
Court or the separation of powers as set forth in the Constitution. Instead, it is
designed to help Congress act within the parameters the Constitution sets and the
Court recently defined.
129 CONG. REC. 96 (1983) (discussing S. 1591, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)).
126 See supra note 109.
"e For an overview of the history of congresssional oversight, see Dixon, supra note 21.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 128-143.
"2 Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legisla-
tive Veto, 32 AD. L. REv. 667, 669 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Congressional Action]; Kaiser,
Congressional Control of Executive Action: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto (July 12,
1983)(unpublished report)(Cong. Research Serv., The Library of Congress).
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ment to the President (or in the event of a presidential veto, an override
by the legislature).2" Since this is the constitutionally prescribed proce-
dure for enacting law, the defects inherent in the legislative veto would be
avoided. " '
The benefits of this option are selfevident; "direct statutory nullifica-
tions or preemptions have the advantage of specificity, clarity, and rela-
tive permanency" as well as "a solid consensual foundation" that results
from consideration by both Houses and the President.' This will further
allow the operation of administrative and executive agencies to remain
unaffected in their routines. While theoretically, congressional interfer-
ence will be rare, on the occasions where it is imperative that the legisla-
ture should intervene, this process assures well considered and specific
mandates.
This alternative, unfortunately, is fairly impractical. At the outset, its
extensive demands on Congress are costly in terms of both resources and
time. Furthermore, this theory partially defeats one of the major advan-
tages of the delegation doctrine. If one theory supporting the delegation
of power is that the agencies are better able to efficiently render technical
and complex decisions, then requiring the legislature to reconsider ad-
ministrative decisions is an unnecessary duplication of effort. Congress
could have reached the same result by submitting such proposals to high-
ly specialized subcommittees, while avoiding the costs of the bureaucracy.
It is possible that efficiency could be better realized by not delegating the
power at all. Still, efficiency is not a truly forceful argument when coun-
terbalanced against the demands of the Constitution.' 3'
2. Statutory Modification of an Agency's Jurisdiction' 3'
Statutes may be utilized to modify the jurisdiction of an agency in or-
der to prevent an objectionable rule from being enacted."' By the use of
this method, Congress may progressively and effectively clarify and refine
agency jurisdiction and power. By redelineating the scope of permissible
administrative activity, the legislature may dictate that a proposed course
of action is beyond the granted authority. Not only would this prescrip-
tion comply with the Chadha demands, but it would also appease those
"I' This alternative is essentially the legislative procedure delineated in Article I of the
Constitution. See supra note 34.
"I For examples of statutes that evidence this type of oversight procedure, see Congres-
sional Action, supra note 128, at 670-672.
Kaiser, supra note 128, at 3.
"' See supra text accompanying note 80.
113 See Congressional Action, supra note 128, at 673-87; Kaiser, supra note 121, at 4.
, Methods of accomplishing this include: a) limiting or abolishing a specified area of
jurisdication; b) transferring jurisdiction from one agency to another or from the federal
agency to state authorities; c) by deregulating an area; and d) by imposing a moratorium on




critics of the legislative veto who contend that the authority delegated to
the agencies is much too broad and vague.
Although this proposal could conceiveably assist Congress in rectifying
errors that were made in the initial enabling legislation, this procedure
does not answer the need for a replacement mechanism for the legislative
veto. The strength of the veto stemmed from its force in regulating
agency activity specifically and efficiently. It is neither practical nor wise
to consider modification of an agency's jurisdiction every time it promul-
gates an objectionable rule. Similarly, deregulating the area (an alteration
of an agency's jurisdiction) does not solve the problem. Additionally, from
a technical perspective, this procedure is as objectionable as the legisla-
tive veto. By preventing a proposed administrative rule from taking ef-
fect, Congress would still be "legislating" outside of the prescribed consti-
tutional procedure. 135 Although labeled as a statutory modification of
jurisdication, its functional effect still remains the same. Congress is in-
terfering with a rule that would otherwise gain the force and effect of law
by way of an unsanctioned procedure. Therefore, this alternative does not
completely solve the problems at hand even though it could be a permis-
sible manner in which to rectify delegation errors.
3. Limitations in Appropriations Statutes'36
Limitations in appropriations may prevent agencies from implementing
particular decisions. "By expressly denying the use of funds for a specific
purpose, such as enforcement or rulemaking, a statute, in effect, nullifies
or severly restricts the broad (and possibly vague) authority under which
an agency is operating in highly specialized area."'3 7 One such proposal
would allow a change in the rules of the House of Representatives which
would allow prohibitions in appropriations bills to block the spending of
money to implement a particular agency regulation.1
This process would inject clarity and specificity into the legislative pro-
cess by determining on an individual basis which promulgations would
receive congressional support. This option could also reinforce the integ-
rity of the Court's rationale in Chadha. While the same overall effect
would result from these "purse-string prohibitions" as from the legislative
veto, that Congress would be determining after an administrative decision
has been rendered which proposals shall not gain approval, the means by
which this could be accomplished are acceptable. Congress had always
controlled the dispersal of appropriations. The choice of which agencies
136 See supra note 32.
136 Kaiser, supra note 128, at 6.
137 Id.
"' The House rules would have to be revised to accomodate this proposal since at the
present time, it is difficult to attach riders to appropriations bills. See 1983 CONG. Q. 1321,
1328 (weekly report July 2, 1983).
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would receive funding and how much they would receive has always de-
pended on what sort of policies the legislature wanted implemented and
which were perceived as necessary. Limitations in appropriations to pre-
vent agencies from implementing particular decions would accomplish the
same objective, except that, in this instance, the directives would be more
specific.
There exists one flaw in this proposition; although Congress may legiti-
mately control the appropriations process, its use in this context may not
entirely comport with the rationale asserted in Chadha. Congress would
still be legislating outside of the manner prescribed in the Constitution;
the legislature would be approving or disapproving of administrative pro-
posals and, in effect, "legislating." Since the Court objected to the legisla-
tive veto because it did not mesh with the constitutional framework, it is
questionable whether the "same device by another name" would be any
more acceptable. This solecism may be further exacerbated by the fact
that this decision could rest with one House of Congress, an enterprise
thoroughly inconsistent with both Chadha and the Constitution.
4. Sunset
Under the "sunset" concept, agencies and their programs are periodi-
cally reviewed under the threat of termination.139 Administrative author-
ity automatically ceases after a certain period of time specified in the
enabling legislation (approximately every four to ten year depending on
the nature of the agency). 140 The impetus behind this mechanism as a
means of oversight is primarily motivational: since agency jursidiction
would have to be systematically reviewed and renewed before its author-
ity could continue, the agencies would presumably comply more closely
with congressional policy directives for fear of permanent termination.




'39 See Adams, Sunset: A Proposal For An Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REV. 511
(1976).
... Adams cynically expressed the rationale supporting this practice: "It has taken years
for some government programs and agencies to evolve to their present levels of mediocrity
and inefficiency. It was not the work of a day. It will not be undone in a day. Periodic
review is necessary." Id. at 529.
... A concept compatible with that of sunset legislation is that which would require notifi-
cation and consultation with Congress by the agency before the implementation of a pro-
gram or a rule. While such a provision would not allow for formal rejection of a proposed
action, it would allow the appropriate congressional committees to be more aware of a
planned action. Congressional scrutiny (and input) would not only have the effect of direct
influence, but it would further allow Congress time to enact legislation to the contrary if the
proposal is objectionable. By allowing for the expression of legislative intent at this stage of
the process, actions taken by the agencies which blatantly defy "congressional authority"
may be noted. See Kaiser, supra note 121, at 9. This idea is compatible with sunset for




This process would be eminently effective in maintaining the degree of
control over the agencies that the Congress possessed via the legislative
veto. Yet one major drawback enures to this theory. With the legislative
veto, Congress was able to prohibit specific administrative proposals from
taking effect. If the suggestion were inconsistent with legislative policy or
if it were merely a distasteful rule, Congress had immediate recourse.
With sunset, Congress would have no alternative but to wait and assume
that administrative determinations complied with legislative directives.
As far as individual decisions were concerned, Congress would be essen-
tially impotent.142 For a Congress that so staunchly defended the veto
based upon this very factor, acquiescence to the sunset proposal as the
sole means by which to monitor agency activity would appear to be
implausible.
V. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE FUTURE OF OVERSIGHT
The proposals discussed above by no means exhaust the possible solu-
tions to the problem left by the Supreme Court after Chadha.143 While all
are effective in regard to specific purposes, none of the proposals to date,
in and of themselves, seem to accomplish the function which the legisla-
tive veto so efficiently performed. By use of the veto, Congress was able
to quickly and cleanly reject very specific proposals while avoiding the
"cumbersome" process of full legislation. In order to effectively replace
the legislative veto as the predominant mechanism of congressional over-
sight, any proposal must not only be able to ensure overall compliance
with congressional policy, but it must also possess the ability to halt par-
ticular offensive proposals.
[W]e must not only be able to rifleshot particular regulations,
though that should be one important weapon in our arsenal, but
we must also reform the agencies' internal rulemaking procedures
authority is available.
... But see supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
... See, e.g., The Bumper's Amendment, S. 1766, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC.
114 (1983)(This proposal would enlist the courts in agency rulemaking by removing the pre-
sumption of the validity for any rule. This recommendation would amend the Administra-
tive Procedure Act in order to impose a more rigorous standard of judicial review for agency
rulemaking.) Future delegations may also be accompanied by "report and wait" provisions.
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)(validating such a provision that established
set period of time after an administrative rule is promulgated before it takes effect, thus
providing the legislature with adequate time to enact legislation to the contrary, if neces-
sary). Also proposed is the Levin-Boren Amendment, S. 1650, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. 103 (1983) (proposing that a legislative veto, by joint resolution be applied to all
rules under the Administrative Procedure Act that are now subject to public notice and
comment. The sponsors of the bill assert that this solves the constitutional problems be-
cause this proposal utilizes a joint resolution, which requires the concurrence of both Houses
and the President).
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to make them more accountable, and we should improve our own
overall oversight efforts in order to determine how well the laws,
agencies, and programs we put in place are working.""'
Although the legislative veto procedure was an effective means by
which to accomplish these goals, a "one-step procedure" such as the veto
is not likely to provide the most suitable solution. The veto did not en-
sure congressional oversight of all administrative activity, it was only a
"last-minute" alternative to prevent objectionable proposals from taking
effect. Congress did not truly oversee, evaluate, or criticize the agencies'
performances. The fact that the legislative veto is so essential suggests
that the present system of congressional oversight is inadequate: the need
for the legislature to be able to strike down particular proposals, no mat-
ter how infrequent, demonstrates that Congress is no longer intimately
involved in the process of the development of far-reaching laws and poli-
cies. The possibility that decisions may be rendered that defy congres-
sional mandates solidifies the argument that Congress has lost control in
areas which it intended to regulate. Although through the use of the veto,
Congress was able to make a "last ditch" effort to become involved in the
formulation of administrative policy, progressive cooperation with the bu-
reaucracy was clearly lacking. The legislative veto was a device to
counteract or destroy policy, not to develop it. Congressional participa-
tion was not fulfilled by use of the veto, for even in its exercise, full con-
gressional consideration was a rare occurrence and specific rationale justi-
fying its use was scarce. " 5 Such cursory examinations of administrative
activity do not even justify congressional consideration. This last minute,
one-step procedure is, therefore, not an adequate means by which to over-
see administrative activity. Any future oversight proposal should pierce
the administrative process and mandate careful and thorough examina-
tion, conviction, and scrutiny. Only through continuous legislative partici-
pation in the process can we be assured that Congress has not technically
abdicated complete authority to the bureaucracy.
Before considering any proposals to correct the system of congressional
oversight, it is important to determine whether a judicial solution aside
from determination of the severability of vetoes may be conceivable. ""
The authority to reject administrative undertakings could be vested in
the judiciary; when particular proposed rules are challenged, the courts
could determine, if appropriate, that the regulations could not stand.
'" 129 CONG. REC. 121 (1983)(Floor statement of Representative Lott).
"4 In Chadha, the House resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. In fact,
the statements by Representative Eilberg were basically the only authority upon which the
one-House veto was exercised. See supra note 64. If vetoes may be utilized after such cur-
sory examinations of the issues at hand, then it becomes clear that "lawmaking" decisions
are essentially being made with far less than bicameral consideration, if that.




This would be accomplished because in response to an individual litigant
who seeks to enjoin the enforcement of an administrative rule, the judici-
ary has the power to strike down rules and regulations as ultra vires of
the congressional delegation of power to the agency.'4 7 Congressional par-
ticipation perhaps could be ensured by allowing intervention on behalf of
the litigant who is challenging the rule.
It is not doubted that an agency may not exercise powers beyond the
authority granted in its enabling legislation. Yet, as a means of oversight,
this theory is not especially pertinent to the situation confronting the leg-
islature today. To vest the power to ensure agency compliance in the judi-
ciary is inexpedient and inefficient. First, unless challenged by an injured
party, an administrative error may remain unrectified. Next, before any
complaint could even be heard in a court, the entire administrative pro-
cess would have to have been exhausted, the controversy would have to
be "ripe," and the individual would have to prove that he had the requi-
site standing. 4 ' Though striking down agency activity as ultra vires of
the delegation may be acceptable in the practice of administrative law, it
by no means solves the problems of inadequate congressional oversight.
Furthermore, this procedure may also present the same difficulties as the
legislative veto: it allows only an ad hoc determination that agency activ-
ity is inconsistent with congressional intent. Legislative participation in
the administrative process would be nonexistent. By allowing only the ju-
diciary to "veto" an agency's determination, then the legislature would, in
fact, be abdicating all of its power in particular areas since there would
exist no means by which administrative activity could be controlled. In
order to avoid this loss of power, the oversight of administrative and ex-
ecutive agencies ought to be exercised by the legislature.
The legislative veto only allowed Congress to pass on a final decision of
an agency. It did not provide for involvement in the entire administrative
process. However, through the creation of a mutifaceted process, Con-
gress could ensure not only compliance with general policy, but could also
assure that particular regulations could be struck down if necessary. The
process is by no means simple. Yet, a more structured and detailed
strategem of congressional oversight could alleviate the need for a device
as "lethal" as the legislative veto. The chance of unacceptable results
could be diminished by streamlining the entire administrative process
and simultaneously expanding it so that continuous congressional partici-
pation would be ensured.
Congessional involvement in the administrative process should be en-
couraged at the outset, starting with the original delegation of power. Ini-
tially, delegations of power to the administrative and executive agencies
.. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n,
310 U.S. 318 (1940); American Tel. & Tel. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
' See supra notes 74 and 76.
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should be created with more explicit, specific, and narrow standards. Af-
ter all, it was the broad, unspecific conferral of power that fashioned the
need for the legislative veto. More meticulous instructions could narrowly
confine the delegated exercises within the intended parameters and thus,
could prevent deviations from the predominating intentions at the
onset.'19
Although narrower delegations may eliminate some of the unantici-
pated deviations from legislative intent, this stage alone is insufficient as
a sole means by which to ensure compliance. Part of the rationale behind
broad delegations was that specificity was impossible. Agencies are often
created to handle particular technical problems, ones with which Con-
gress is not equipped to deal. In these cases, Congress may not even have
the expertise to narrowly specify policies. It is not until the area has been
developed by the agency that the legislature is able to pass judgment.
Thus, while in some respects it may be ideal to confine the scope of an
agency's activity at the outset, it may not always be possible or practical.
It is in these instances where Congress cannot be precise that a more
comprehensive scheme is necessary.
Following the delegation of power to the agency, the legislature ought
to be involved in the development of policy from its inception. Congres-
sional participation could best be accomplished in two ways. First, the
agency, as it formulates both rules and policy, could be required to confer
with a congressional committee (or subcommittee) which has appropriate
jurisdiction in the agency's area of expertise. The other option is to pro-
vide for congressional input during the agency's rulemaking proceedings.
In both situations, the legislative contribution would be continuous. Since
members of Congress would be actively involved in every stage of the de-
velopment of administrative policies, the agency would have constant
feedback from the committees involved as to whether the proposed mea-
sure comported with legislative intent. By virtue of this constant source
of interchange and advance notice, the agency could alter its design to
comply more ably with congressional mandates and wishes. This benefit
is further augmented when taken in conjunction with the nature of the
delegation of powers. Often, as stated, enabling legislation is unduly
broad and vague because the legislature does not yet possess the specific
knowledge and singular expertise with which to delegate specifically. Un-
til the agency has had an opportunity to explore and develop an area of
potential legislative regulation, Congress is unable to narrow its man-
dates. Since these initial policy directives may not be possible, by al-
19 While narrower delegations may solve part of the problem, they are be no means a
panacea. Though they may enable the agencies to comply more closely with congressional
mandates (because those instructions are now more lucid), the problem still exists that Con-
gress is not always able to delegate with such specificity. Often Congress lacks the skill and





lowing continued congressional participation in the rulemaking processes
of the agencies, the legislature would be able to develop policies as the
information becomes known. At this stage, Congress could refine its man-
dates, immediately communicate this to the agency and thereby diminish
the chance occurrence of deviations. This would, in turn, give rise to an
atmosphere of cooperation with the agencies.
Additionally, a proposal of this nature would not manifest one of the
shortcomings which made the legislative veto so objectionable. The veto
procedure only allowed Congress to approve, disapprove, terminate, or
amend administrative action after the agency had rendered its decision.
As noted, congressional participation was a virtual nullity. This theory,
on the other hand, injects strength into these earlier stages, and the need
for the veto could be lessened for, theoretically, proposed administrative
schemes would already reflect legislative pursuits.
While congressional participation in administrative processes may be
cumbersome and demanding in terms of both time and limited resources,
involvement at this stage is most critical. The very essence of oversight
would be realized by allowing Congress to truly oversee administrative
activity. Thorough examination would reinforce the assertion that
through the delegation of power, Congress is not relinquishing its legisla-
tive authority. Yet even at this stage of the process, it is still evident that
less than the full legislature is participating in the formulation of policy.
Although continued congressional participation is inherent in this
scheme, additional and full legislative participation ought to be allowed
in order to assure that administrative policies are not dictated by smaller
committees involved in the rulemaking process. Outside influences are
more likely to work effectively in small arenas; by permitting full congres-
sional consideration of all administrative proposals, these forces will be
diminished and the chance for a decision by a nationally-elected, well-
balanced quorum could be maximized.
To allow for full legislative involvement in the process of developing
administrative rules, the agencies should then be required to submit the
proposed regulation to both houses of the legislature. Pursuant to a "re-
port and wait" provision,1 50 no administrative rule would gain the effect
of law until a specified period of time had elapsed. This precept would
not become "law" only if the rule were vetoed by a joint resolution. 15'
This determination would require the concurrence of both Houses of
Congress as well as the President, thus alleviating the constitutional
shortcomings manifested by the legislative veto. Fundamentally then, the
V See supra note 143.
While the reverse of this is possible-that no administrative rule shall take effect un-
less a joint resolution of approval is passed-it cannot survive the constitutional restraints
enumerated in Chadha. If both Houses are required to pass a regulation if it is to take
effect, the failure of one House to concur essentially operates to the effect of a one-House
veto.
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denunciation of the rule will have been overwhelmingly recommended
and the decision will have been wellconsidered and carefully analyzed." 2
Although this stage could be construed as burdensome and inefficient,
this effect will be diminished since the proposals will have been scruti-
nized in advance of their submission to the legislature. The possibility
that the joint resolution will be necessary becomes minimal. This option
would exist primarily as an "emergency" measure for those occasions on
which an objectionable course of action has passed beyond the adminis-
trative stage.
It is possible that the joint resolution could be utilized to replace the
legislative veto, without adding the other suggested reforms. In some in-
stances, this would be advisable. The proposals previously noted are par-
ticularly geared to rulemaking proceedings of administrative agencies, yet
they do not operate as effectively in adjudicatory areas, as was the case in
Chadha. In these more specific areas where continuous congressional in-
volvement would be but a pipe dream, the joint resolution may be neces-
sary. Unlike the rulemaking proceedings, specific rules are not being
promulgated in adjudications and neither can specific canons always be
applied. In fact, each decision is based upon only the individual facts of
each case. Therefore, to require continued legislative participation in a
proceeding which is applying rules, rather than making them, would serve
no useful function. However, since these decisions are being made pursu-
ant to the delegation of authority to an agency, there still ought to be a
check over the decisions. The joint resolution could serve this purpose. In
those instances, such as Chadha, both presidential and congressional con-
sideration would be assured.
In other instances, the joint resolution should be utilized in conjunction
with the other phases of this proposal. Although through the joint resolu-
tion, we are assured of full congressional participation and evaluation of
administrative proposals, its use alone avoids one of the basic problems
underlying congressional oversight today. If it were the only means of
oversight used, continued congressional participation in the administra-
tive procedures would be lacking. Oversight should not merely encompass
the opportunity to strike down specific administrative rules, but it should
guarantee that those individuals who are directly responsible to the con-
stituents would be formulating the law rather than merely determining
approval or rejection. Therefore, the comprehensive scheme is more
palatable, as it gives strength to the meaning of congressional oversight.
One final step would complete the scheme of comprehensive congres-
sional oversight. All agency activity ought to be subject to "sunset." In a
complex technical society where agencies may be created to deal with a
complex albeit transient, problem, continued existence of all agencies
may not be practical, desirable, or required. Periodic review performed by




the congressional committees with appropriate jurisdiction would evalu-
ate agency performance, particularize agency strengths and infirmities,
and guide future action. By this evaluation Congress will then be able,
when necessary, to alter an agency's jurisdiction, preempt an area of au-
thority, modify its appropriations, or terminate its existence altogether.
Pragmatically, agencies should be reviewed frequently. Furthermore, con-
tinued administrative vitality should not be renewed unless expressly
reauthorized. In this way, careful evaluation is assured and agency juris-
diction is certain not to be continued merely due to congressional neglect.
Though this juncture may not allow the legislature to "rifleshot" par-
ticular offensive administrative proposals, it does seem necessary to an
efficient integrated scheme of delegated authority. Total revocation of the
power of an agency may seem dramatic when viewed as a reaction against
misuse of delegated power. However, sunset is not intended to function
solely as a mechanism to replace the legislative veto: sunset alone cannot
guide the formulation of administrative policy so that it complies with
legislative intent. The threat of termination of an agency's existence af-
forded by sunset does not give the legislature the ability to disapprove of
administrative proposals. Rather, it operates more as a threat or punish-
ment after the fact. However, though the threat of termination may not
have a great effect on the day-to-day decisionmaking process of an
agency, such a tool may be a reliable guage by which to evaluate overall
functioning. Through periodic review of administrative activity, continu-
ous refining of the enabling legislation or working guidelines of an agency
will ensure a carefully wrought administrative system.
Sunset may seem to be a burdensome process. To encumber the legisla-
ture with yet another duty might appear impractical. Yet, it would be
necessary for the legislature to "clean house" in order to streamline the
bureaucracy. Continuous reorganizatin of the administrative system could
lead to an efficient process. By periodically allowing Congress to refine
the enabling legislation of the agencies, it would become less likely that
agencies could be rendering decisions inconsistent with congressional
policies.
This scheme for refinement of the system in which delegated power is
exercised may be berated for its breadth. After all, it was not the entire
system of administrative law and the delegation of power that was disap-
proved in Chadha: the legislative veto was the only device whose sound-
ness was being questioned. While this may be true, this criticism ignores
part of the basic rationale underlying the use of the veto in the first in-
stance. The legislative veto was instituted to protect against unchecked
administrative power which was difficult to control as a result of broad
nonspecific delegations. Used as a last resort to prevent misuses (and
abuses) of authority, the legislative veto was efficient, but it by no means
streamlined the administrative system. This proposal starts at the root of
the problem, rather than merely curing the symptoms. By demanding leg-
islative involvement from the inception of the enabling legislation
1984-85]
43Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
through to the promulgation of various and particular rulings, Congress
will be better able and equipped to monitor agency activity. As a result of
continued participation, not only will the risks of a total abdication of
congressional power to the agencies by unfounded, but so will the virtues
of the delegation doctrine be reinforced. The agencies would still be able
to investigate complex and technical problems. Furthermore, the agencies
could still promulgate opinions, proposals, and rules. The only major
change would be the increased force of legislative input. Ideally, the need
for the legislative veto would be nearly nonexistent. The fact that the
legislative veto was ever necessary at all suggests that perhaps the system
of delegation was out of control.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it may not be altogether clear from the Court's opinion in
Chadha whether all legislative vetoes are invalid, subsequent decisional
law and congressional response make it appear likely that this is, in fact,
the case. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that the decision has propa-
gated serious reconsideration of congressional oversight. This process of
evaluation is sure to be as controversial as was the neverending debate
concerning the validity of the legislative veto. The proposals proffered are
not the first nor will they be the last solutions to the questions left open
by the Supreme Court. All that is selfevident now is that there is no
agreement.
The suggestions that will now be presented to alleviate the gap in con-
gressional oversight mechanisms will undoubtedly take the Chadha deci-
sion into account. Any future device will have to fit within the guidelines
carefully prescribed by the Court. However, the Chadha decision must
not only be analyzed for what effect it will have one the future of over-
sight, but it must also be rationalized in terms of its wisdom. From a
theoretical perspective, this was quire a precarious decision. Putting all
technical arguments aside, it must be asked whether this case should have
been decided. Specifically, at one time the delegation of power was chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds, and while not surviving initial scrutiny,
eventually it was overwhelmingly accepted. 15 Yet, the fact remains that
these agencies are not specifically sanctioned or prohibited in the Consti-
tution. Since they were not authorized, neither were any means with
which to control them. Perhaps, these "extraconstitutional" bodies man-
dated the use of an extraconstitutional device. If the Framers had antici-
pated the growth of the "fourth branch" then perhaps they would have
devised an oversight mechanism such as the legislative veto. It is this set-
ting in which the veto should be evaluated. Strict reliance on the Consti-
tution cannot take the development of agencies into account and there-
"' See supra note 12.
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fore, when the legislative veto is examined, it ought to be in the context
of the government as a whole and not in isolation. History cannot and
should not be examined in a vacuum.
The force and effect of the Supreme Court's decision may diminish
over time. It may be weakened by subsequent judicial determinations or
by an alternative mechanism that renders the need for the legislative veto
obsolete. However, until a choice is made one way or another, the status
of congressional oversight is unclear. It is evident that the same question
is facing everyone now, the lower courts, the legislature, the President,
and the agencies: where do we go from here?
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